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ZNY CCCCC ZZH
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FM AMEMBASSY HARARE
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 3170
INFO RUCNSAD/SOUTHERN AF DEVELOPMENT COMMUNITY COLLECTIVE
RUEHAR/AMEMBASSY ACCRA 2142
RUEHDS/AMEMBASSY ADDIS ABABA 2262
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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 HARARE 000607

SIPDIS

AF/S FOR S. HILL
ADDIS ABABA FOR USAU
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STATE PASS TO USAID FOR E. LOKEN AND L. DOBBINS
STATE PASS TO NSC FOR SENIOR AFRICA DIRECTOR B. PITTMAN

E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/02/2018
TAGS: PGOV PREL ASEC PHUM ZI
SUBJECT: ZANU-PF--MDC PREPARATION FOR NEGOTIATIONS

REF: HARARE 605

Classified By: CDA Khatherine Dhanani for reason 1.4 (d)

SUMMARY

¶1. (C) MDC president Morgan Tsvangirai briefed diplomats from the U.S., UK, Sweden, and Australia July 12 on the ZANU-PF--MDC negotiation process. He said representatives from his faction (MDC-T), the MDC Mutambara faction (MDC-M) and ZANU-PF had concluded a Memorandum of Agreement (MOA) for negotiations. He anticipated the MOA would be signed by himself GOZ president Robert Mugabe and MDC-M leader Arthur Mutambara on July 16 with negotiations to begin a week later. Tsvangirai was emphatic that he would not accept an ultimate agreement that did not leave the MDC in control of government, but acknowledged that a best-achievable scenario might leave Mugabe as part of the government. Tsvangirai also expressed appreciation for efforts to pass the UN sanction resolution and said the most effective sanctions effort now would be to target children of sanctioned individuals. END SUMMARY.

Memorandum of Agreement and Negotiations

¶2. (C) Tsvangirai said the MOA was intended to define a framework for negotiations between ZANU-PF and the two MDC factions. Tendai Biti and Elton Mangoma represented MDC-T, Welshman Ncube and Priscilla Misihairabwi-Mushonga represented MDC-M, and Patrick Chinamasa and Nicholas Goche represented ZANU-PF. Talks occurred on July 10 and July 11.

¶3. (C) Tsvangirai expected the African Union to appoint a mediator to work with South African president Thabo Mbeki, although South Africa was taking the position that it should be the sole mediator. Names that had been mentioned included former UN secretary-general Bhutros Ghali, former Tanzanian presidents Joseph Warioba and Benjamin Mpaka, and

South African businessman and ANC heavyweight Cyril Ramaphosa. Tsvangirai was confident someone--not necessarily those mentioned--would be identified and that South Africa would accept a co-mediation role.

¶4. (C) Tsvangirai stated that Mugabe's role in the mediation would have to be agreed upon. The MDC, according to Tsvangirai, would recognize Mugabe as the head of ZANU-PF, one of the parties to the negotiation, but would not recognize him as head of government. Additionally, one of the pre-conditions to negotiations was an end to violence, and a mechanism for monitoring violence would have to be addressed.

¶5. (C) The South African-drafted MOA would be presented to the parties on July 14, according to Tsvangirai. Mugabe, Tsvangirai, and Mutambara would then sign it on July 16. Negotiations would begin one week later. Tsvangirai stated that ZANU-PF wanted to conclude the negotiations within two weeks; the MDC thought a month was a more reasonable period. Tsvangirai noted that he expected to have a one-on-one meeting with Mugabe before the MOA was signed.

¶6. (C) Tsvangirai opined that there were three possible outcomes to the negotiations: 1) a coalition government led by ZANU-PF; 2) a power-sharing government based on the Kenyan model; and 3) a transition government led by the MDC. He was firm that only the third outcome would be acceptable to the MDC. He noted that this might well include a role for Mugabe, and asked understanding from the international

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community should that come to pass.

¶7. (C) South Africa, according to Tsvangirai, was amenable to an MDC-led transitional government. General Solomon Mujuru would also willingly accept such an outcome. Mujuru found Tsvangirai and the MDC more acceptable than Emmerson Mnangagwa; also, Mujuru was looking for a way out of the current crisis that would result in an unfreezing of his assets. (NOTE: Mujuru previously told us that the U.S. had frozen \$7 million of his money. END NOTE.) Despite acceptance of MDC leadership by South Africa and Mujuru, Tsvangirai, recalling past ZANU-PF perfidy, cautioned against getting hopes up.

A Note on the UN Resolution

¶8. (C) Tsvangirai expressed appreciation for efforts to pass the UN sanctions resolution. He believed that, more than additional sanctions, ZANU-PF heavyweights were worried about ending up at The Hague. Passage of the resolution would have been a step in that direction and useful in exerting more pressure on the regime. At this point, to exert more pressure, he suggested targeted sanctions against the children of sanctioned individuals to prevent them from traveling to and studying in the U.S., UK, and Australia.

COMMENT

¶9. (C) ZANU-PF is a fractured party and there are those like the Mujurus who would like to see the end of a Mugabe-led government. Having observed what ZANU-PF was willing to put Zimbabwe through in the last several months in order to maintain power, we find it difficult to believe, however, that the party will willingly cede power to Tsvangirai. We need to make clear to all parties that the USG will accept only an MDC-led government and that reengagement is dependent upon actions as defined by our principles--concrete steps toward political and economic reform. A ZANU-PF--MDC agreement by itself is not enough.

Dhanani